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TEXAS LAW AND LEGILATION
REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-A JUDICIAL OR A
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM?
T HE century and a quarter that has elapsed since Edward Liv-
ingston wrote his code of criminal procedure has witnessed
vast changes in our social structure. The automobile, the airplane,
the radio, and countless other innovations all have contributed to
the many-fold acceleration of the tempo of society. Almost no
aspect of human existence has remained unaffected and unchanged.
Although criminal motives have, as always, remained unchanged,
criminal methods have not; there has been terrifying progress in
the technique of crime. Today's well-equipped bandit can do the
work of a dozen brigands of Edward Livingston's day.
There is, however, one tool of society in which there has been
only slight progress: The procedure by which the modern high-
speed criminal is brought to justice is essentially the same pro-
cedure created by Edward Livingston more than a century ago, and
put into use in Texas more than ninety years ago.1 Since its enact-
ment in 1856 the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has been
patched sporadically but has never enjoyed a thoroughgoing over-
haul.2 Is it, then, unreasonable to suggest that this procedure,
geared to the tempo of a society which no longer exists, is no longer
sufficient?
Texas must be provided with a criminal procedure that is not only
adequate to present needs but also sufficiently adaptable to accom-
modate itself to future requirements. It should be at least as pro-
gressive as the criminal with whom it must cope. Hope of attaining
1 See Wilkinson, Edward Livingston and the Penal Codes (1922) 1 TEX. L. REv. 25.
2 Probably the most far-reaching change in the Code was effected by the adoption of
the Common Sense Indictment Act in 1881. Tex. Laws 1881, c. 57, p. 60, 9 LAWS OF
TEXAS (Gammel, 1898W 152, carried forward in the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1895 as articles 448 to 464, and appearing as articles 405 to 412 in the Code of 1925.
[Vol. 1
REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
this ideal would seem to lie in the frequently espoused proposal
that the courts be charged with the duty and responsibility of
maintaining an adequate procedure, and that the judiciary-be given
the power necessary to perform that duty." An examination of the
successes and failures of the past as well as the merits of the proposal
will, perhaps, shed light on its efficacy.
At the time Henry II laid the basis of modem procedure in the
twelfth centry, justice was not a right but a royal prerogative.
There was no separation but rather a fusion of the powers of gov-
ernment in the person of the king. In the absence of royal edict,
procedure was largely controlled by the custom of the court. The
existence of a custom was, of course, determined by the judge and
thereafter preserved in men's memories and, later, in the Year
Books.' At an uncertain time (but very early in English legal his-
tory) the courts began regulating practice by formally declared
rules of court.' In this manner an intricate system of procedure
was built up which, as it matured, became fixed and settled. Until
the nineteenth century Parliament interfered with procedural mat-
ters only rarely.
This rigid court procedure was abruptly antiquated by the speed-
up of society attendant upon the Industrial Revolution. In the early
part of the nineteenth century public opinion, led by a crusading
press, condemned the legal profession in unmeasured terms and
demanded reform. These attacks were fiercely resisted by the
3 See, e. g., Kaplan, The Validity of Legislative Regulation of Procedure (1941) 16
TEMP. L. Q. 51; Simpson, Power of Courts over th.- Rules of Procedure (19461) 27 A. B.
A. J. 591; Dean, Rule-Making for Criminal Procedure (1940) 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 81;
Pound, Practical Advantages of Rules of Court for Criminal Procedure (1939) 25 A. B.
A. J. 825; Cummings, A Rounded System of Judicial Rule-Making (1938) 24 A. B. A. J.
513; Taft, Success of English Proredure Attributed to Judge-Made Rules (1925) 9
J. AM. JuD. Soc. 126; Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure (1918) 2 MINN.
L. REv. 81; Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915) 10 ILL.
L. REv. 163.
4 See Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and its Exercise by Legislatures
(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 772.
5The oldest known Chancery Orders go back to 1388, the oldest Common Law Rules
to 1457. Rules of the King's Bench date from 1604. It seems clear that these are not the
oldest rules since some of them refer clearly to older ones. See JENKs, A SHORT HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (2d Am. ed. 1922) 188.
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judges and lawyers who considered their beautifully complicated
procedure to be the ultimate fruition of human logic.' Parliament,
grown strong but reluctant to withdraw from the judges what it con-
sidered to be the very necessary function of issuing rules of prac-
tice,' compromised with the enactment of the Civil Procedure Act of
18338 by which the courts were expressly authorized to make rules
for the reform of pleading. The judges, apparently not understand-
ing what was expected of them, published the famous Hilary Rules
of 1834 which removed some of the anomalies of common-law
pleading but were generally disappointing.9 In 1852 Parliament
moved again, this time enacting a code of 239 sections. 0 The code
was, in effect, a suggestion offered to the courts since the act gave
them power to repeal, modify, or add to the code as they saw fit.
Parliament was still looking hopefully to the courts to take the
lead in the reform.
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873 made sweeping
reforms in the court structure to remove jurisdictional conflicts
between divisions.' In addition it returned full rule-making power
to the courts12 and created a council of judges required to meet
annually to consider revisions of the rules." This council, ex-
panded in 1909 to include four members of the legal profession in
addition to eight judges,1" now bears the responsibility for main-
6 For an interesting account of the dispute see Sunderland, The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 725.
7 See JENKS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 189.
83 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42.
9 The rules were a compromise "between the conservatism of six centuries and the
demands of modem criticism and modern convenience." HEPBURN, HisTORY OF CODE
PLEADING (1908) 77
10 Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 VIcr., c. 76.
1136 & 37 VIcT., c. 66.
121d., §§ 71, 74.
13 Id., § 75.
14 Judicature (Rule Committee) Act, 1909, 9 Eow. VII, c. 11. The Rule Committee in
its present form consists of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of
the Rolls, the President of the Probate Division, four other judges of the Supreme
Court, two practicing barristers, and two practicing solicitors. Supreme Court of Judica.
ture (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, § 99 (4).
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taining an effective legal procedure, except for certain phases of
criminal procedure that have been placed under the control of
other judicial committees." The Rule Committee, as it is now
called, has power to repeal, amend, or add to the rules after forty
days notice, subject to annulment by either house of Parliament.'"
The power to annul has rarely, if ever, been exercised by Parlia-
ment.
From this brief resum6 of England's long struggle for procedural
reform, two things are immediately apparent. In the first place,
during the eight-hundred years that have elapsed since the founda-
tions of the modem system of judicial administration were estab-
lished, Parliament never undertook "to chain the courts to the
chariot wheel of a legislative code of procedure."' 7 The control of
practice has never been considered other than a judicial function.
Second, the judiciary, the element which conserve,, is inherently
inert. England's present high degree of procedural efficiency came
only after that inertia was relieved by fusing the judges and repre-
sentatives of the bar into a body having no other purpose than the
improvement of procedure.'"
When the United States borrowed England's procedure, practice
there was governed by the King's courts at Westminster. Rules
issuing from these courts governed not only their own practice, which
was largely appellate, but also the trial proceedings in the courts of
15 Power to control criminal appellate procedure by rules of court was conferred upon
the Lord Chief Justice and the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal by the Criminal
Appeal Act, 1907, 7 EDw. VII, c. 23, § 18; Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. V,
c. 86, §§ 16, 17; Coroners (Amendment) Act, 1926. 16 & 17 Gao. V, c. 59, §§ 257. The
Indictments Act, 1915, 5 & 6 GEo. V, c. 90, § 2, prescribed short form indictments to
replace the cumbersome common-law indictments, and created a special rule committee,
headed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, to make rules regulating indictments. The
rules of criminal procedure promulgated by these agencies are subject to the approval
of the Lord Chancellor and may be annulled by either house of Parliament.
16 36 & 37 VICT., c. 66, § 68.
17 Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power (19261 12 A. B. A. J. 548.
is See Sunderland, The Judicial Council as an Aid to the Administration of Justice
(1941) 35 AM. POL. Sci. Rav. 925.
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assize and nisi prius, which were independent courts." This un-
questionably furnished the pattern for practice in this country."'
But the procedure then employed in England was, as we have
observed, hopelessly inadequate; and it was quite as inadequate
to the needs of this country.
American jurisdictions entered at once upon a season of legisla-
tive Control of procedure. Even as Congress created the federal
court system, it undertook to control judicial procedure in actions
at law.2 In 1848, while Parliament was patiently trying to prod
England's inert courts into taking the lead in reform, New York's
legislature took unto itself complete control over procedure in that
state with the enactment of David Dudley Field's code. The Field
Code set the pattern of reform in other states and the movement
spread rapidly. Code-making became the legislative fashion of the
day. Undoubtedly, the precedent furnished by the Field Code was
a factor leading to the adoption of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Legislative control of procedure is not consistent with the doc-
trine of the separation of powers,"' but that inconsistency was no
deterrent to the code movement. The doctrine was understood in
its broader aspects, but understanding of its exact application was
10 See Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915) 10 [1.1.. L.
REV. 163.
20 In 1792 when the Attorney General requested information concerning the rules,
and regulations governing the procedure of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice stated
that "The Court considers the practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in
England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from
time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary."
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 411 (U. S. 1792).
21 TEMPORARY PRocEss ACT, 1 STAT. 93 (1789) ; PERMANENT Ptocess ACT, 1 STAT.
276 (1792).
2" See Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judi:ciary Procedure are Void Constitu-
tionally (1928) 23 IUL. L. REv. 276; cf. Kolkmaa v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575
(1931); Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 Pac. 780 (1929) ; Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Company, 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
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shadowy.2" It was considered only slightly restrictive of the legisla-
ture; enthusiasm for the new democracy had engendered the idea
that the legislature, as the immediate representative of the people,
was supreme. The lawyers of the period were largely apprentice-
trained, which training consisted of little more than instruction in
local procedure. Such training fostered the idea that procedure is
the main department of the law and, if the separation of powers
is to be observed, should be left to the legislature. Failing to
recognize the distinction between procedure and substance, they
thought of the right in terms of the remedy.
The code movement was the natural result of causes peculiar
to the moment. Procedure was inadequate, and the courts, en-
grossed with the task of building a system of substantive law, had
little time for procedure. The legal profession, here as in England,
was obstinately arrayed against reform. It was inevitable that the
people should look to the legislatures for leadership, far greater
faith being reposed in the legislatures than in the judiciary."
The movement spread until twenty-nine states and two territories
were controlling the details of procedure by statute, 5 but the codes
23 The courts seem to have accepted, without argument or analysis, the power of the
legislatures to control procedure. For example, Chief Justice Marshall declared that the
courts "may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of
declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not
be contended that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the inter-
vention of the courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the
judicial department." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (U. S. 1825). It is interest-
ing to note, however, that an amendment to the Constitution of New York was considered
necessary to confer the power upon the Legislature to enact the Field Code. See Hanna
v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 51 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd without
opinion. 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
2, See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599.
25 New York in 1848, Missouri, 1849; California, 1850; Iowa, 1851; Kentucky. 1851;
Minnesota, 1851; Indiana, 1852; Ohio, 1853; Oregon, 1854; Washington, 1854; Ne-
braska, 1855; Texas, 1856; Wisconsin, 1856; Kansas, 1859; Nevada, 1860; North Dakota,
1862; South Dakota, 1862; Arizona, 1864; Idaho, 1864 Montana, 1865; Arkansas, 1868;
North Carolina, 1868; Wyoming, 1869; South Carolina, 1870; Utah, 1870; Colorado,
1877; Connecticut, 1879; Oklahoma, 1890; New Mexico, 1897; Alaska, 1900; and
Puerto Rico. 1904. See Cushing, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, supplement to
March, 1927, A. B. A. J. 14.
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did not prosper. In 1908, just prior to his election as President,
Taft voiced his opinion that codes of procedure were generally
much too elaborate.2" In his message to Congress on December 6,
1910, he called upon it to enact legislation empowering the Su-
preme Court to regulate, by rules of court, the procedure in actions
at law as well as equity.2" In 1909 a committee of the American
Bar Association urged several principles of procedural reform, one
of which was stated as follows: "Whenever in the future practice
acts or codes of procedure are drawn up or revised, the statutes
should deal only with the general lines to be followed, leaving
details to be fixed by rules of court, which the courts may change
from time to time, as actual experience of their application and
operation dictates." '28
New York, leader of the movement, failed to find the anticipated
procedural peace under the Field Code, which, within a few years,
had swelled from a modest 391 sections when enacted to more than
3,000 sections. In 1904 a board was appointed to study possible
simplification of New York practice. The board reported in 1912
that "the present code system in this state of regulating details of
practice by statute has been tried and has so lamentably failed and
has been condemned in such unmeasured terms that it may be
passed by without further comment."2' In 1926 Professor Sunder-
land, surveying the history of procedure in America, concluded
that the enactment of the Field Code "was a political and economic
blunder of the first magnitude, and set a precedent which changed
the American judicial establishment from a living stream into a
stagnant pool."'" The legislatures had unquestionably failed to
vindicate their invasion of the judicial province.
26 Taft, The Delays of the Law (1908) 18 YALE L. J. 28, 31.
27 46 CoNc. REc. 25 (1910).
28 Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed
Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Costs in Litigation (1909) 34 A. B. A. REP.
578, 595. Dean Pound, a member of the Committee, urged the same principle the follow-
ing year in an article entitled Some Principles of Procedural Reform (1910) 4 ILL. L.
REv. 388, 491.
29 Quoted in Stewart, Rules of Court in Iowa (1928) 13 IowA L. Rrx. 398, 400.
so Sunderland, The Exeicise of the Rule-Making Power (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 548, 549.
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Statutory procedure failed for lack of flexibility. The rigidity
of the codes gave rise to frequent need for repairs-repairs which
the legislatures were ill-equipped to make."
The codes represented an attempt to create, a priori, a system of
procedure that would be sufficient to every occasion-an attempt
to serve a dynamic society with a static procedure. The frequent
use of mandatory words added to the inflexibility which had re-
sulted from the embodiment of procedural rules in statutory form.
The intrinsic shortcomings of the code provisions as enacted
were not infrequently multiplied by narrow construction at the
hands of unsympathetic or even hostile courts. In respect to the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, it could perhaps be said that
the construing court suffered from an excess of sympathy for the
accused. Later, the Court of Criminal Appeals, required by statute
to prepare a written opinion in every case," apparently seized upon
technicalities occasionally to reach results considered desirable on
the merits. However collected, these undesirable precedents clung
like barnacles, disrupting the smooth flow of justice. Ordinarily
they could be removed in no less drastic manner than by removal
of the impaired rule and substitution of a new one-surgery that
could be performed only by the Legislature.
But the legislatures, composed largely of laymen," had little
occasion to observe the working of the codes and remained in igno-
ance of procedural shortcomings. In recent years proposals for
change and improvement have most frequently come from the bar
3 The Honorable William D. Mitchell, in his address, Uniform State and Federal
Practice (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 981, 982, quotes the late Judge Cardozo as follows: "The
Legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the
courts, without expert or responsible or systematic advice as to the workings of one rule
or another, patches the fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend."
32 TEX. CODE CrIM. PRoc. (1925) art. 847.
33 Out of 150 members of the Texas House of Representatives only 56 were lawyers in
1941. See Simpson, Power of Courts over the Rules of Procedure (1941) 27 A. B. A. J.
591,593.
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(the body best acquainted with procedure) and have been regarded
with cynical suspicion by the law-makers. '
To the inertia of legislatures, not cognizant of the need for
change, was added the inertia engendered by divided responsibility
for effective procedure. It was difficult to place the blame for pro-
cedural aberrations; the courts and the legislatures were found
pointing accusing fingers at one another. Thus did the pressure of
public opinion, prime mover of legislatures, become diffused for
lack of focal point.
Legislatures convened infrequently, were usually confronted
with a large volume of pressing political issues to be considered.
In the rush of business reform bills were pushed aside and allowed
to die on the calendar. 5 The legislators, ignorant of the need for
change and the effect of a proposal, quite naturally chose to leave
what they considered "well enough" alone, shielded as they were
by the courts from the direct glare of public opinion.
Many of the intrinsic disabilities that doomed legislative control
to failure would be relieved by the return of the rule-making power
to the court. It would effect the highly desirable purpose of uniting
the power of control with the responsibility for the exercise of that
power; the courts would be enabled to discharge that duty for
which they are now responsible in the eyes of the public.
Failure to make use of the available expert knowledge in the
accomplishment of a highly technical task is improvident. The
court, better trained than the legislature and constantly occupied
with procedure, has a far better knowledge of the operation of
34 "The [Texas] Legislature evidently has the idea that the Supreme Court can not
be trusted to make the rules. There seems to be a suspicion somewhere that somebody is
'trying to put something over' in the enactment of this measure." Report of Committee on
Remedial Procedure and Law Reform (1929) 48 PRoc. T.x. BAR Asso. 68, 70.
35 "In view of the failure of the Texas Legislature to respond to the suggestions of
the Bar Association and the Judicial Section in the matter of amending the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the members of the Section at this meeting expressed themselves
freely in the belief that the duty and responsibility of making rules of procedure for the
courts in both civil and criminal cases ought to be restored to the courts." Report of the
Judicial Section (1935) 54 Ptoc. TFx. BAR Asso. 206, 207. See also Report of Special
Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, id. at 218.
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the rules. It "will not have to be taught the existing practice and
the mischief as well as the proposed remedy.""6 In session for at
least nine months out of every year rather than biennially, as the
legislature, the court could subject the rules to a continuous study,
making amendments as the need became apparent. Proposals
offered by the bar would receive serious consideration unshadowed
by that suspicion with which they seem to be regarded by the leg-
islature. In this manner all the trained legal talent in the state could
join the battle for better procedure.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of court-made rules over pro-
cedural statutes would lie in the attitude of the court interpreting
the rules. It is inconceivable that the court would be other than
sympathetic to its own rules. They would be so construed as to
effectuate the purpose for which they were promulgated. In their
status as rules of court they could be liberally applied so as to
prevent any particular oppression, whereas "Legislative rules are
inflexible; and, when explicit and clearly understood, they must
be enforced without regard to the individual injury that may be
the result."" Procedure, relieved of its present inflexibility, could
fulfill its office as handmaiden rather than master in the administra-
tion of justice.
Historically, the record of the courts in regulating procedure is
little better than that of the legislatures. The legislatures have been
guilty of misfeasance; the courts, of nonfeasance. We have seen
that the procedural reform that has come to England in the last
century and a half came, for the most part, in spite of the courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States, empowered in 1792 to
make rules governing procedure in equity," allowed thirty years to
36 Pound, The Rule-Making Power oi the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599, 602.
8- De Leon v. Owen, 3 Tex. 153, 154 (1848) ; accord, Stephens v. Herron, 99 Tex. 63,
87 S. W. 326 (1905) ; House & Co. v. Burnett, 40 Tex. 346 (1874) ; Mills v. Bagby, 4
Tex. 320 (1849) ; Holmes v. Coalson, 178 S. W. 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915), aft'd, 111
Tex. 502, 240 S. W. 896 (1922).
38 1 STAT. 276 (1792).
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slip by before the power was exercised." The equity rules promul-
gated in 1822 were not changed for another twenty years,' and
thereafter remained largely unchanged until supplanted by the
equity rules of 1913.4' The Michigan Court, empowered by the
constitution to make rules, remained inactive for eighty years."
The Virginia Court of Appeals was, after the passage of three
enabling acts, induced to make one rule.:'
This apparent failure of the judiciary to sustain the burden of
creating an adequate procedure has been attributed to two factors.
First, the courts, with their crowded dockets, are simply too busy
to undertake the painstaking task of drafting new rules of pro-
cedure. Second, there is inherent in courts generally slight incen-
tive to act; as commonly understood, the judicial function is not
to create but to conserve.
It is not suggested that the drudgery of drafting new rules should
be performed by the judges of the court. Such a burden in addition
to their official duties would be intolerable. The spade work should
be done by a body of experts created for that purpose. In this con-
nection it is interesting to observe the method employed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in drafting the new Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court appointed an Advisory
Committee composed of lawyers, judges, and law teachers, with
membership well distributed geographically. The Committee fell
to work on a preliminary draft, giving attention to procedures ei-
ployed in each state, in other countries, and to the code of criminal
procedure drafted by the American Law Institute. Each senior
39 The thirty-three equity rules of 1822 are reported in 7 Wheat. v (U. S. 1822'
4 The equity rules of 1822 were supplanted in 1842 by ninety-two rules reported in
1 How. i (U. S. 1843).
41 The rules, eighty-one in number, are reported in 226 U. S. 649 (1912).
42 The power to regulate procedure was conferred upon the Supreme Court of
Michigan in 1850 by the Constitution, but the power was not exercised in a substantial
manner until 1931, after the bar had obtained enactment of a bill requesting the court
to-act. See Harris, The Extent and Use o1 Rule.Making Authority (1938) 22 J. AM. Juu.
Soc. 27.
43 See Sunderland, The Judicial Council as an Aid to the Administration ol Justice
(1941) 35 Am. POL. Sct. REV. 925.
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circuit judge appointed a bar committee in each of his districts to
study the problem and make suggestions to the Advisory Committee.
Suggestions so made were, after careful consideration by the Ad-
visory Committee, synthesized into tentative drafts which were circu-
lated among the bar committees for further study and criticism. The
final draft, approved by the Supreme Court acting more as arbi-
ter, was submitted to Congress for its consideration. Congress
raised no objections to the Rules, and they became law on March
21, 1946.'
The machinery for regulating procedure in the federal courts
is subject to criticism on one count: No provision has been made
for a possible recrudescence of the court's traditional inertia; no
permanent body has been created for the purpose of subjecting
the rules to a continuous critical study. It is true that the Supreme
Court has continued the advisory committees in existence,'" but
the foresight exhibited by that Court would seem to offer no reason
for the failure of Congress to insure constant surveillance of the
rules. Texas is equipped with a body created by statute in 1929
"for the continuous study of and report upon the organization,
rules, procedure and practice of the civil judicial system of this
State."' 8 This body, the Civil Judicial Council, is required to report
annually to the governor and to the Supreme Court. There seems
to be no valid reason why the duties of the Council should not be
expanded to include criminal as well as civil matters, with a cor-
responding expansion of the membership to include some experts
on the administration of criminal justice. The fact that the Coun-
cil's function was limited to civil matters exemplifies the neglect
which has led to the decay of the State's criminal process.
The problem as to which of Texas' two "supreme" courts should
be invested with control of criminal procedure will be determined
44 For a more elaborate discussion of the machinery employed in formulating new
federal rules see Holtzoff, Participation of the Bar in Judicial Rule-Making (1943) 3
F. R. D. 165; Cummings, The New Crimipal Rules -Another Triumph of the Demo-
cratic Process (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 236.
45 Order, 314 U. S. 720 (1942).
48 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2328a.
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by the degree of esteem accorded the one or the other. The seem-
ingly logical answer is that the court of last resort in criminal
matters should control the procedure. But Section 25 of Article V
of the Texas Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to make
rules of procedure for itself "and the other courts of this State."
It is believed that either court could constitutionally be empowered
to make the rules. In the case of the Supreme Court no further
enabling act would be necessary-only a repeal of the statutory
rules of procedure-for the Supreme Court is empowered by the
Constitution to occupy so much of the field as is not occupied by the
Legislature." It would be necessary to pass an enabling act to
empower the Court of Criminal Appeals to make the rules, but
such an act would not be an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power. "The authorities clearly establish that the power to
regulate procedure is considered a judicial power, or at least that
it is not considered to be a purely or distinctively legislative
power.
48
If the Texas Legislature sees fit to confer the criminal rule-
47 Article V, Section 25 of the Constitution of 1876 conferred the rule-making
power on the Supreme Court without restriction. The Section was amended in 1891 to
restrict the power to the promulgation of rules "not inconsistent with the laws of the
state." The fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals was created by the same constitu-
tional amendment that restricted, but re-emphasized, the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court would seem to evidence an intent that the Supreme Court should make
the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals as well as for the civil courts.
It is apparent that the Texas Civil Judicial Council concluded, after five years' study
of the judicial system of the state, that the Supreme Court rather than the Court of
Criminal Appeals is the proper body to control criminal procedure. The Council has
proposed an amendment bo the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, Section 8 of which
would empower the Supreme Court to make "all rules of practice and procedure for all
the courts of the system." Section 6 would create an advisory judicial council for the
continuous study of the rules, criminal and civil. The proposed amendment, a worthy
opus, would go far to cure the administrative and procedural ills of the state's judicial
system. See PRoPosED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLEV OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION RELATING
To THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF TEXAS AS REDRAFTFD BY THE TExAs CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL
(1946).
4s State v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646, 659, 110 A. L. R. 1, 19 (1936) ; accord,
Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 61 (U. S. 1825) ; Burney v. Lee, 59
Ariz. 360, 129 P. (2d) 308 (1942) ; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 21 So. (2d) 605,
158 A. L. R. 699 (Fla. 1945) ; State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court,
148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928); In re Constitutionality of Wisconsin Statute, 204
Wisc. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931).
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making power on the appropriate court, it will not be pioneering
in that field of procedural reform, although it might have taken the
lead in the reform had it acted when the measure was first urged
upon it a quarter of a century ago." Since that time the field has
been well explored. As we have seen, the power of the courts to
control procedure has never been denied in England. With the
appearance of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the
control.'of federal practice by the Supreme Court became com-
plete."0 A number of states have granted to their supreme courts full
49 At the meeting of the Texas Bar Association in 1920 Judge C. H. Jenkins proposed
a constitutional amendment vesting the rule-making power in a judicial council. (1920)
39 PROc. Tax. BAR Asso. 30. Two years later a resolution was offered urging the repeal
of all statutory rules of procedure to be replaced by rules of court. (1922) 41 id. at 57.
The following year President W. A. Wright in his opening address urged, "Stop the
Legislature from tinkering with every little petty detail of procedure. Cut out the legis-
lative details of procedure and practice, and let the Supreme Court, aided by dis-
tinguished members of the District Bench and of the Bar, make your rules, that they
may amend, abolish or amplify, as experience teaches." (1923) 42 id. 6, 12. To the same
effect, see Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure,
id. at 113. The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform urged, "First:.That rules
prepared by the Supreme Court, with the aid of a commission of lawyers appointed on
the recommendation of the judges of the Supreme Court, be substituted for all statutes
on procedure, civil and criminal." (Italics added.) Id. at 39. The proposal was unani-
mously adopted by the Association. Id. at 127. The Committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform for the following year recommended the same principle, (1924) 43 id. at
29, and it was again adopted by the Association. Id. at 62.
The same or similar proposals were made in 1926, 45 id. at 170, adopted at 173, in
1928, 47 id. 50, 68, in 1929, 48 id. 68, and again in 1932, 51 id. at 172. In 1935 both the
Judicial Section of the Bar Association and the Special Committee on Criminal Law and
Procedure urged "that the duty and responsibility of making rules of procedure for the
courts in both civil and criminal cases.., be restored to the courts." (Italics added.) 54
id. 206, 218, adopted at 208. The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure reported
in 1942 that efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice by piecemeal legis-
lation had proved to be of little use. It urged that the power to control criminal pro-
cedure be conferred upon either the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court.
See Report (1942) 5 TEX. BAR J. 211, adopted (1942) 61 Ploc. TEx. BAR Asso. 36.
5) Complete control over federal procedure has come to the Supreme Court gradually
over the past century and a haif; Equity, 1 STAT. 276 (1792) (for the Rules see notes
38-40, supra) ; Admiralty, 5 STAT. 516 (1842), see Rules in 1 How. xli (U. S. 1842) ;
Bankruptcy, 30 STAT. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C. 1 53 (1940), see Rules in 172 U. S. 653
(1898) ; Copyright, 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25 (1940), see Rules in 214 U. S.
533 (1908) ; Criminal Appeals, 47 STAT. 904 (1933), 18 U. S. C. § 688 (1940), see Rules
in 292 U. S. 661 (1933) ; Civil Procedure in the District Courts, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934),
28 U. S. C. § 723b - c (1940), see Rules in 308 U. S. 645 (1939) ; Criminal Procedure
before Verdict, 54 STAT. 688, 18 U. S. C. § 687 (1940), see RULES OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1944).
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rule-making power in matters criminal as well as civil.' Notable
among these states is Arizona for the abruption with which com-
plete reform came. In 1939 the Arizona Legislature passed an act
giving the Supreme Court full power to regulate procedure. 2 New
civil rules went into affect on the following January 1. They were,
in substance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure modified in a
very few instances to suit local conditions. 3 Three months later,
on April 1, new rules of criminal procedure went into effect. With
the exception of one inappropriate chapter out of twenty-five, the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted
in Arizona."4
Texas has not been wholly backward in the matter of procedural
reform; in 1939 the Forty-sixth Legislature thought it desirable
to vest in the Supreme Court complete control over civil pro-
cedure." The reasoning which compelled that act is equally com-
pelling as to criminal procedure. As Dean Pound has observed,
"On the whole, what has been said repeatedly in the past thirty
years as to legislative regulation of civil procedure is quite as
applicable to criminal procedure." 6 To fret over the rights of the
51 Courts of the following states have full control over criminal procedure: Arizona,
ARZ. CODE (1939) §§ 19-202-4 (procedural statutes to continue in force as rules of
court until modified or suspended by order of the Supreme Court) ; Idaho, Idaho Laws
1941, c. 90, H1 1-5 (statutes in conflict with rules of court are of no further force) -
Missouri, Mo. CoNSr. (1945) Art. V, § 5; New Mexico, N. M. STAT. (Supp. 1938) §§
34--501-2 (procedural statutes to remain in force as rules until changed by the Supreme
Court) ; North Dakota, N. D. REv. CODE (1943) § 27-0208; South Dakota, S. D. CODE
(1939) § 32.0902 (procedural statutes to remain in force as rules until changed by the
Supreme Court); Washington, WASH. CODE (Pierce, 1939) §§ 8676-1-2 (statutes to
remain in force as rules until modified by the Court); West Virginia, W. Va. Laws
1935, S. B. 220, p. 170 (statutes to continue in force as rules until modified by the
Court) ; Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. (1941) § 251.18 (statutes to continue in force as rules
until modified by the Court).
52 ARIZ. CODE (1939) §§ 19-202-4.
53 See Sunderland, Arizona's New Rules of Civil Procedure Eflect Conformity with
Federal Rules (1940) 23 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 215.
54 See (1940) 23 J. Am. JUD. SoC. 174.
55 Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon's Supp. 1939) art. 1731a.
5s Pound, Practical Advantages of Rules of Court for Criminal Procedure (1939) 25
A. B. A. J. 825.
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accused is useless; those rights are embodied in the Constitution
beyond the reach of either court or legislature.
There is good reason to believe that, should the Legislature, or
the people by constitutional amendment, confer upon the proper
court the power to control practice, Texas would be benefited by
a vastly improved system of criminal procedure. Here again the
trail has been blazed. The new Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure pre now being tested. Formulated in the manner described
above, these rules are the distillate, the essence of the considered
opinions of numrous leaders in the legal profession, and, as such,
are worthy of more than a passing consideration.
The American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure is the
product of a vast amount of time and money expended on research
by the leading experts in the field. These works and the experiments
that have been conducted in the other forty-seven "laboratories"
should clearly define the path to the ideal in procedure-that pro.
cedure which "is a means, not an end; (which is) made subsidiary
to the substantive law as a means of making that law effective in
action.""
George G. Potts.
57 Pound, The Canons of Procedural Reform (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 541, 543.
1947]
